Abstract-With the requirements of mobility, flexibility, and rapid response, wireless mesh networks are widely used for emergency services to improve the efficiency of public safety communication to prevent or respond to incidents that harm or endanger persons or property. In this paper, we propose a practical scheme of key agreement with asymmetric encryption based on station-to-station protocol and a privacy enhanced scheme of key agreement with directed signature using the elliptic curve ElGamal cryptography for public safety communication in wireless mesh networks. In the result, only both participants can gain the shared secret key, however, any party else can not understand the key agreement process clearly. We analyze the properties of security and efficiency of the privacy enhanced scheme of key agreement in comparison to the station-to-station protocol and the practical scheme of key agreement with asymmetric encryption. The results of experiment show that the privacy enhanced scheme of key agreement can provide resistance to the unknown key-share attacks, privacy protection for sensitive information included in signature and better efficiency in terms of computational cost.
I. INTRODUCTION
The essence of mobility, flexibility and rapid response to incidents determines the public safety communication networks will move, expand and shrink with several special characteristics, i.e., fast transmission, anticipation of accessibility to incident area networks, security and privacy protection [1] , etc. With the characteristics of rapid deployment, low cost, decentralized planning, flexible networking and resilience against access point failures [2] [3] , the wireless mesh networks (WMNs) are widely used for emergency services such as police, fire and emergency medical services to improve the efficiency of public safety communication to prevent or respond to incidents that harm or endanger persons or property [4] [5] . Such public safety mesh networks allow the persons, vehicles and aircrafts from all categories of incident response teams to form multiple instantly mobile networks seamlessly as they arrive. Having the ability to communicate more effectively and securely in public safety field allows better decision making whether to save lives or to preserve property.
Public safety mesh networks, as shown in Fig. 1 , consist of wireless infrastructure, mobile mesh routers and mobile nodes. The wireless infrastructure comprises static mesh routers and existing infrastructure where the static mesh routers connect to the existing infrastructure to form the backbone of incident area networks for emergency first responders and public safety personnel. The mobile mesh routers form an instantly mobile backhaul mesh to provide users with incident area coverage for wireless access services. And the mobile nodes enable the peer-to-peer applications at an incident by forming an instantly mobile ad hoc mesh network.
For obvious reasons, the public safety communication is extremely cautious about the safeguard for sensitive data and brings new security challenges for the special characteristics and requirements. Security and privacy are normally accomplished via security protocols and subsequent distribution of a cryptographic key. As a public safety individual comes into an incident, he turns on his communication device, says a mobile node, and registers with his positive identification on it. From that moment on, all communications from the node are associated with only that individual. Then the mobile node registers with the incident area networks. In some special scenarios, e.g., hostile fields or confidential communications, the key agreement scheme demands peer-to-peer communication with privacy protection where only both participants can gain the shared secret key between the participant and the peer, and any party else can not understand the key agreement process clearly.
In this paper, we propose a practical scheme of key agreement with asymmetric encryption based on stationto-station protocol and a privacy enhanced scheme of key agreement with directed signature using the elliptic curve ElGamal cryptography for public safety communication in wireless mesh networks where the directed signature can be verified only by the designated receiver and be applied to protect the privacy of the specific receiver in many situations where the signed message contains information personally or commercially sensitive to the receiver. In the result, only both participants can gain the shared secret key, however, any party else can not understand the key agreement process clearly. We analyze the properties of security and efficiency of the privacy enhanced scheme of key agreement in comparison to the station-to-station protocol and the practical scheme of key agreement with asymmetric encryption. The results of experiment show that the privacy enhanced scheme of key agreement can provide resistance to the unknown key-share attacks, privacy protection for sensitive information included in signature and better efficiency in terms of computational cost.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we review the related work at key agreement with privacy protection. In Section III, we present our practical scheme and privacy enhanced scheme of key agreement respectively. In Section IV, we analyze the properties of security and efficiency of the schemes. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section V.
II. RELATED WORK
Since Diffie and Hellman introduced the concept of public key cryptography in 1976 [6] , the digital signature schemes, such as DSA [7] , ECDSA [8] etc., have been made to ensure the authenticity of message. The stationto-station protocol (STS) originally presented in 1987 in the context of ISDN security [9] consists of DiffieHellman key agreement, followed by an exchange of authentication signatures. The full STS protocol [10] incorporates the public key certificates into the key exchange of STS protocol to make the verification keys known in advance between the parties. For many researches on STS, see [11] [12] [13] . The STS protocol uses a basic digital signature scheme with symmetric encryption to support the key confirmation with privacy protection during the key agreement but it has to face the unknown key-share attacks [14] .
The authenticated Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocols have an important role for building secure communications amongst two or more entities [15] . Many proposed schemes related to the authenticated key agreement have appeared in the literature [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] . The authenticated key agreement protocols use authentication techniques to provide a support for trust key agreement but it has to face the problem of privacy protection since the basic digital signature allows anyone to verify it using the corresponding public key. In some special scenarios of public safety communication, e.g., hostile fields or confidential communications, the incident individual is unwilling to make the sensitive information included in signature, i.e., who issues the signature or who is the designated receiver, available to the general public and hence to any adversary. Intuitively, the key agreement scheme with asymmetric encryption intends to obtain the objectives of key agreement with privacy protection, but that's not the only choice especially considering the computational cost.
In 1993, Lim and Lee [21] [22] first introduced the concept of directed signature. With the property that can be verified only by the signature receiver, the directed signature is applied to protect the privacy of the specific receiver in many situations where the signed message contains information personally or commercially sensitive to the receiver. Since the station-to-station protocol shows merits in efficiency and the directed signature scheme shows merits in privacy protection, we integrate them to research the privacy enhanced scheme of key agreement for public safety communication in wireless mesh networks.
III. PRIVACY ENHANCED KEY AGREEMENT
We assume that notation p is a big enough prime and notation g is a primitive element corresponding to a cyclic group Z p * . The parameters p and g are public to all users. Notations Sign and Verify are functions of signing and verifying signature using suitable algorithms. Notation E k is a function of encrypting message with a cryptographic key k using a suitable encryption algorithm. Alice and Bob have their public and private key pairs, i.e., (pk A , sk A ) and (pk B , sk B ), respectively. Notations ID(A) and ID(B) represent the identifications of Alice and Bob, respectively. Alice initiates the key agreement to Bob. We also assume that Alice knows Bob's authentic public key, and vice versa. Our constructions of key agreement schemes are based on the station-to-station protocol. The basic protocol is briefly described.
A. Station-to-Station Protocol
The station-to-station protocol is described as follows.
• Step 1: Alice creates a random number a with . Then Alice sends {ID(A), ID(B), c} to Bob.
• Step 2: Bob creates a random number b with Fig. 2 , consists of three message exchanges between Alice and Bob and uses a basic digital signature scheme with symmetric encryption to support the key confirmation with privacy protection during the key agreement.
B. Our Practical Scheme of Key Agreement
The practical scheme of key agreement with asymmetric encryption based on the station-to-station protocol is described as follows.
• Step 1: Alice creates a random number a with
, signs a signature The practical scheme of key agreement with asymmetric encryption, as shown in Fig. 3 , consists of two message exchanges between Alice and Bob and uses a basic digital signature scheme with asymmetric encryption to support the key agreement with privacy protection. Relatively to the station-to-station protocol, the practical scheme becomes suitable to the requirement of fast transmission in public safety field communication.
C. Our Privacy Enhanced Scheme of Key Agreement
The privacy enhanced scheme of key agreement with directed signature is described as follows.
, and signs a signature the signature s B is invalid, Alice discards the message
The privacy enhanced scheme of key agreement, as shown in Fig. 4 so that only Bob can directly verify the signature and can prove its validity to any third party C, whenever necessary.
The generation and verification of the directed signature based on the elliptic curve ElGamal cryptography follow the steps below.
The directed signature's generation by Alice to Bob is described as follows.
• Step 1: Alice picks at random k with 1≤k＜n and gcd(k, n)=1 and computes R=k·B=(x, y), r=x mod n. If r=0 then go to step 1.
• Step 2: Alice computes
If s=0 then go to step 1.
• Step 3: Alice sends {m, R, s} to Bob. The directed signature's verification by Bob is described as follows.
• Step • Step 3: Bob checks that V 1 =V 2 . The verification procedure works because
Whenever necessary, Bob can use zero-knowledge proof techniques to prove the validity of the signature to a third party C so that C can gain nothing but the validity of the signature. The proof of validity of the signature by Bob to C is described as follows.
• Step 1: Bob computes
and sends {m, R, s, V} to C.
• Step 2: C computes
If it does not hold, C halts. Otherwise, C computes U=s·R.
• Step 3: Bob picks at random k with k∈ [1, n-1] and computes
and sends E 1 and E 2 to C.
• Step 4: C picks at random ω and sends it to Bob. Certainly we can use the directed signature scheme with encryption to improve the security of signature. The generation by Alice to Bob is described as follows.
• Step 1: Alice picks two random numbers k 1 , k 2 with 1≤k 1 ＜n, 1≤k 2 ＜n, gcd(k 1 ,n)=1, gcd(k 2 ,n)=1, and computes
where r 1 =x 1 mod n and r 2 =x 2 mod n. If r 1 =0 or r 2 =0 then go to Step 1. • Step 4: Bob checks that V 1 =V 2 . The verification procedure works because
The proof of validity of the signature by Bob to C is described as follows.
and sends {m, G, R 2 , s, V} to C.
and checks V 1 =V 2 . If it does not hold, C halts. Otherwise, C computes U=s·R 2 .
• Step 4: C picks at random ω and sends it to Bob. According to our objectives, we can choose a proper directed signature scheme to improve the privacy protection. Using the proposed directed signature scheme, we can construct our privacy enhanced scheme of key agreement to accomplish the key agreement with privacy protection for the special requirements of public safety communication in wireless mesh networks.
IV. SECURITY AND EFFICIENCY
Key agreement is a process by which both parties, e.g., a group leader and the first responder to an incident, or responders, contribute information to derive a shared secret key. The key may subsequently be used to achieve some cryptographic goal such as confidentiality. So the established key should be shared by the specified entities. We analyze the properties of security and efficiency of the privacy enhanced scheme of key agreement in comparison to the station-to-station protocol and the practical scheme with asymmetric encryption.
A. Security Consideration
Consider the directed signature scheme. The directed signature scheme has to face the security challenges in two cases. The first one is the adversary attempts to retrieve the private key and the secret parameters of signer. The second one is the adversary attempts to impersonate signer to sign the signature.
In case one, the security of the scheme relies on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms for elliptic curve over finite fields. In the result, it is difficult for an adversary to determine d A and k from the common parameters {E,p,n,P,A,B,R}. In case two, a forger can not generate a valid signature to satisfy the verification equation without knowing the private key and the secret parameters. Therefore, the directed signature scheme appears to be secure as long as the discrete logarithm for elliptic curve over finite fields is difficult to compute. Besides the above discussions, selecting a proper elliptic curve E and a large prime number p is very important to ensure the security of the scheme.
Owing to the essential consideration on the implicit key authentication property, the station-to-station protocol succumbs to the unknown key-share attack which is an attack whereby an entity A ends up believing she shares a key with B, and although this is in fact the case, B mistakenly believes the key is instead shared with an entity E ≠ A [14] .
Consider the privacy enhanced scheme. Consider the privacy enhanced scheme of key agreement for public safety communication in wireless mesh networks.
1) Known-key security and forward secrecy. The scheme provides the assurance of the known-key security and forward secrecy using independently random generation techniques.
2) Key-compromise impersonation. Suppose Alice's long-term private key sk A is disclosed and an adversary Eve knows the value. Clearly Eve can impersonate Alice to Bob using sk A . Also, the adversary Eve can impersonate Bob to Alice knowing Bob's long-term private key sk B . However, it is desirable that this loss does not enable the adversary Eve to generate the same shared key 
, the adversary Eve intercepts it and replaces the identity ID(A) with ID(E).
Eve then passes message (1'), i.e., Even though the adversary Eve registers Alice's public key pk A or Bob's public key pk B as its own, i.e., pk E = pk A or pk E = pk B , Eve can not perform the attack against the responder or the initiator for the mentioned above.
B. Efficiency Consideration
The experiment environment involves Matlab version 7.8.0.347 (R2009a) 32-bit (win32), Microsoft windows XP professional version 2002 service pack 2, Intel Pentium 4 CPU 3.00 GHz and 512MB. The system setting is defined in a small size as follows. Let E: y 2 ≡ x 3 +ax+b (mod p) be an elliptic curve defined over a finite field F p where a := 2, b := 24, p := 97, the primitive element P := (2, 6) , and the P's order n := 103.
Consider the directed signature scheme. We compare the directed signature scheme with encryption, says Scheme I, to the basic digital signature scheme with encryption based on ECDSA, says Method I, in terms of computational cost. The Method I is briefly described below.
The signature's generation of Method I by Alice to Bob is described as follows.
• Step 1: Alice picks two random numbers k 1 , k 2 with 1≤k 1 ＜n , 1≤k 2 ＜n, gcd(k 1 ,n)=1, gcd(k 2 ,n)=1, and computes
where r 1 =x 1 mod n and r 2 =x 2 mod n. If r 1 =0 or r 2 =0 then go to Step 1. If s=0 then go to Step 1.
• Step 3: Alice sends {c, G 1 , G 2 , s} to Bob. The signature's verification of Method I by Bob is described as follows.
• Step • Step 4: Bob checks that V 1 =V 2 . We catch twenty samples, as shown in Table I , and draw the difference of signature's generation between Method I and Scheme I in Fig. 5 and the difference of signature's verification between Method I and Scheme I in Fig. 6 , where S-Sig and M-Sig represent the signature's generation of Scheme I and Method I, respectively, and S-Ver and M-Ver represent the signature's verification of Scheme I and Method I, respectively. Based on the comparison we can draw a conclusion that the directed signature scheme can effectively protect the private information included in the signature at a little computational cost.
Consider the privacy enhanced scheme. Considering the advantages of the station-to-station protocol and the practical scheme of key agreement clearly, the privacy enhanced scheme of key agreement makes a trade-off between the security and efficiency. In terms of computational cost, the crucial difference between the practical scheme of key agreement, says Method II, and the privacy enhanced scheme of key agreement, says Scheme II, exists in the process of message exchange from Alice to Bob where Method II uses basic digital signature and asymmetric encryption and Scheme II uses directed signature. So we focus our attention on the difference between Fig. 7 and the verification and decryption of Method II and the verification of Scheme II in Fig. 8 , where D-Sig and D-Ver represent the generation and verification of the directed signature, respectively, Sig-Enc represents the basic digital signature's generation and asymmetric encryption, and Ver-Dec represents the basic digital signature's verification and asymmetric decryption.
From the results of experiment, we can draw a conclusion that the privacy enhanced scheme of key agreement with directed signature shows better efficiency in terms of computational cost in comparison to the practical scheme of key agreement with asymmetric encryption.
V. CONCLUSION
Due to the new security challenges for the public safety field communication, we propose a practical scheme of key agreement with asymmetric encryption based on the station-to-station protocol and a privacy enhanced scheme of key agreement with directed signature using the elliptic curve ElGamal cryptography for public safety communication in wireless mesh networks where the directed signature can be verified only by the designated receiver. In the result, only both participants can gain the shared secret key, however, any party else can not understand the key agreement process clearly. The results of security analysis and efficiency comparison show that the privacy enhanced scheme of key agreement with directed signature can provide resistance to the unknown key-share attacks, privacy protection for the sensitive information included in signature and better efficiency in comparison to the practical scheme of key agreement in terms of computational cost. In the future, we plan to apply our scheme to many more situations in secure communication and perform more thorough analysis of the scheme to further improve the adaptability of our key agreement scheme. 
